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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 13-2459 
___________ 
 
IN RE:  TORMU E. PRALL, 
                                             Petitioner 
____________________________________ 
 
On a Petition for Writ of Mandamus from the 
United States District Court for the District of New Jersey 
(Related to D.N.J. Civ. No. 3-11-cv-06355) 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Rule 21, Fed. R. App. P. 
June 6, 2013 
 
Before:  AMBRO, SMITH and CHAGARES, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: June 18, 2013) 
_________ 
 
OPINION 
_________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
Tormu E. Prall has filed a pro se petition for a writ of mandamus seeking to 
compel the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey to rule on his 
pending petition for a writ of habeas corpus.  For the following reasons, we will deny the 
mandamus petition. 
A writ of mandamus is a drastic remedy available only in extraordinary 
circumstances.   See In re Diet Drugs Prods. Liab. Litig., 418 F.3d 372, 378 (3d Cir. 
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2005).  A petitioner seeking the writ “must have no other adequate means to obtain the 
desired relief, and must show that the right to issuance is clear and indisputable.”  
Madden v. Myers, 102 F.3d 74, 79 (3d Cir. 1996).  Generally, a court’s management of 
its docket is discretionary, see In re Fine Paper Antitrust Litig., 685 F.2d 810, 817 (3d 
Cir. 1982), and there is no “clear and indisputable” right to have a district court handle a 
case in a particular manner.  See Allied Chem. Corp. v. Daiflon, Inc., 449 U.S. 33, 36 
(1980) (per curiam).  That said, a writ of mandamus may issue where a district court’s 
“undue delay is tantamount to a failure to exercise jurisdiction.”  Madden, 102 F.3d at 79.  
In October 2011, Prall filed a petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.  After 
receiving warnings pursuant to Mason v. Myers, 208 F.3d 414, 418 (3d Cir. 2000), Prall 
notified the District Court in September 2012 that he wished to proceed with his habeas 
petition “as is.”  Prall also submitted, inter alia, several discovery-related requests and a 
motion construed by the District Court as seeking to amend his habeas petition.  The 
District Court denied those motions without prejudice in March 2013.  Thereafter, Prall 
filed motions pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(1), seeking to challenge 
the District Court’s March 2013 orders.  Those motions remain pending.  Prall filed the 
present mandamus petition on May, 22, 2013.
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 This is Prall’s third mandamus petition seeking to compel the District Court to rule on 
his petition for a writ of habeas corpus.  We denied the prior two petitions.  See In re 
Prall, C.A. No. 12-1046 (order entered on Feb. 7, 2012); In re Prall, C.A. No. 12-2478 
(order entered on Aug. 27, 2012.).   
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We note that the overall proceedings related to Prall’s habeas petition have been 
protracted, that the respondents have not been served with the petition, and that Prall 
claims that his sentence expires in November 2015.  Nevertheless, we are not presented 
with any evidence of extraordinary delay, nor do we have reason to believe that there will 
be delay going forward, particularly in light of the District Court’s recent adjudication of 
Prall’s discovery motions and motion to amend.  Significantly, a substantial portion of 
the delay in adjudicating the case appears to be attributable to the motions filed by Prall.  
In short, because the delay about which Prall complains is not “tantamount to a failure to 
exercise jurisdiction,” Madden, 102 F.3d at 79, we will deny the petition for a writ of 
mandamus.
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 Prall’s motion for “expedited consideration” is denied. 
 
